Based on the current state of EU law and the political sentiment
Introduction
The regulation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) has challenged the unification and harmonization of the European regulatory state like nothing else. In an attempt to mitigate a collision between Community and Member State interests 1 , Europe has devised a complex approval system whereby both Member States and Community institutions have input at discreet stages into the approval process. Despite the Member
States' more limited role in the GMO approval process, they have wielded their power mightily, bringing the entire regulatory procedure to a standstill in most instances. While this has appeased environmental interests in Europe, it is by no means a regulatory solution. The question still remains as to how to organize an efficient and effective regulatory policy for biotechnology.
Despite the lack of overwhelming scientific opinion on the exact risks that GMOs pose to human health and the environment, there is no doubt that GMOs do pose some risks beyond those which convention products pose and the European marketplace has already grown accustomed to. In general, GMOs present risks to human health and to the environment. The risks GMOs pose to human health were what first captured the public's imagination, specifically that genetically modifying food would lead to "changes in allergenicity, toxicity, or nutritional composition of foods." ; and unintentional effects on non-target species, such as when GM plants designed to kill pests also kill non-pests. 7 For Europe, with its relatively small landmass, the environmental risks are compounded. Deliberate release of GMOs is by definition trans-boundary, as the GMOs interact directly with the environment. This risk of "free migrants" is particularly troubling if Member States are to have different regulatory regimes for GMOs; despite any legal barriers an individual Member State may put up to the trans-border movement of GMOs, the risk still remains that GM crops or seeds could cross national boarders of their own free will. In essence, the choice of one Member State to permit GMOs into the market could be a choice for all. The fact that GMOs may not be easily removed from the environment once they are introduced makes the GMO question a unique lens through SCIENTISTS' WORKING GROUP ON BIOSAFETY, MANUAL FOR ASSESSING ECOLOGICAL AND HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS (1998)). 3 Id. at 351-2. The most famous example of GMO poisoning was when Kraft, a large manufacturer of food products, inadvertently mixed Starlink corn, which was engineered to produce a bacterial toxin poisonous to insects, with corn used in the production of food for human consumption. CHALLENGES 127, 131 (1999) . 6 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 4 at 131. 7 Id. which to view issues of European integration; particularly integration of the regulatory state.
Based on the current state of Community law and the political sentiment surrounding GMOs, this paper argues that the best approach to regulating the import and suspended the consideration of applications for GMO release in their territory, bringing the regulatory system to a standstill. This section highlights some of the problems inherent in the current regime, particularly the way science and policy are considered in asymmetrical ways at different stages of the approval process. This creates a disproportionately large burden on Member States seeking to protect their domestic markets from GMOs.
The problem of diminished regulatory choices for "third-party" Member States is addressed in Part III. If a third-party Member State does not approve of the release of a specific GMO into the territory of another Member State, it may object at the Community stage of the approval process. Due to the unbalanced application of scientific and policy considerations and the comitology procedure, however, objections are rarely effective.
Part III also examines another option for third-party Member States -outright bans on GMOs -and determines that based on current case law, the European Court of Justice Member States, the GMO regime may be more effectively and efficiently handled by a system that employs regulatory anarchy; whereby twenty-five interested parties are initially brought to the table to approve a release (rather than one Member State), leaving less opportunities for regulatory capture by one Member State and still leaving room for Community supervision. Part IV uses the example of the Regulation on Food and Feed to illustrate how the system is already moving in this more effective direction.
II. The Deliberate Release Approval Process -An Amalgam of Competences
The EU currently regulates the release of GMOs via a set of directives and 
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The Deliberate Release Directive was adopted pursuant to Article 95 of the EC Treaty, which empowers the Council to adopt measures having as their objective the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
13
The directive, necessarily then, has as its primary function the regulation of the internal market. The directive does identify a range of objectives that may be pursued in the GMO approval process: the directive imposes a duty on Member States to take "all appropriate measures" to avoid , and a centralized Community stage, similar to that which is used in marketing certain medicines.
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Regulatory power does not accrue exclusively to any one level of governance but is shared across different levels.
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Before a manufacturer or importer can place a GMO on the market of a Member State, it must first submit a notification dossier to the "competent authority" of the Member State.
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The Member State's competent authority must carry out a risk assessment of the product; particularly noting the environmental risk assessment (ERA) submitted by the applicant, recommendations for safe use and handling of the product, and whether the product represents a risk to human health or the environment. Based on this reasoning, it becomes clear that the power division within the Deliberate Release Directive is not hierarchical in the sense of a Member State decision having priority over Community decisions. Rather, the power structure is better described as all Member State decisions having priority over Community decisions. What this leads to is a situation where the more strict regulatory preferences of some Member States are undermined by the less strict regulatory preferences of perhaps just one.
B. Science, Policy, and the Regulatory Blockade
The desire for harmonization and the free movement of goods on the part of Community institutions necessitated the centralization present in the approval system, primarily to prevent wildly different interpretations among the Member States of the risks that GMOs present.
44
The political sensitivity of GMOs, however, required that Member
State regulators have significant input into the determination of risks of biotechnology, as well as participation in the final approval decision.
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The complexity of this procedure concocted to serve dual needs of the Community and Member States has created an administrative morass with the outcome being an approval process obstructed by unresolved conflicts -only one GMO has been placed on the market since the Deliberate
Release Directive was adopted, Monsanto's "Roundup Ready" maize in Spain.
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The reasons for the blockage vary at the Member State stage from some Member
States not allowing release in the face of negative public opinion, to certain Member
States using this procedure to put pressure on Community institutions for political gain.
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Because approval at the Community stage relies on a qualified majority vote either in a regulatory committee or the Council, consistent dissent by some Member States has led to an inability to come to decisions either approving or rejecting release.
48
This in turn has led to the Commission taking ultimate responsibility for the decision, as provided for under comitology procedures, further delegitimizing the system.
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Part of the problem may be attributed to the divergence between science and policy at the different stages of the approval process. , the ECJ has narrowed it. In Keck, the ECJ held that "selling arrangements" that were generally applicable and affected the both domestic and foreign traders in the same manner "in law and in fact" fall completely outside the scope of Article 28 and therefore are not reviewable by the court.
80
Selling arrangements include regulations that deal with the way a product is sold but do not deal with actual characteristics of the product itself.
81
Because a ban on GMOs would by nature deal with the characteristics of the product itself and not the way it is sold, despite the generally applicable and non-discriminatory nature of a ban, it would most likely fall within the scope of Article 28. The prohibition on trade-distorting measures under Article 28 is not absolute.
The ECJ acknowledged that obstacles to free movement caused by differences in regulation are acceptable so long as they are found necessary to satisfy "mandatory requirements," such as "the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defense of the consumer." The Campus Oil decision has sustained some criticism 98 and may be limited to the public security exception. The court has not been as generous with exceptions based on human health or the environment in areas where harmonization has already occurred.
99
It is unlikely the ECJ would look favorably on a reliance on Campus Oil.
In terms of environmental justifications, the Commission has already dealt with this issue in the case of Upper Austria's attempt to declare itself a "GMO free zone." farmers, constituted a specific problem for the region.
103
In this example, while Austria's desire to tolerate zero risk was not challenged substantively, the means by which it illustrated the threat posed by GMOs was, thereby bringing the whole regime into question.
The structure of the Deliberate Release Directive has mitigated a strict reliance on mutual recognition as the sole means of determining safety throughout the Community by requiring other Member States to participate in the approval process.
104
The basic principle is that a Member State has the opportunity of preventing a GMOs movement through the whole of the Community.
105
This discretion, of course, relies on the initial receiving Member State sending a favorable opinion to the Commission in the first place and on the objecting Member State being able to assert a compelling case for refusal despite potential favorable opinions by the receiving Member State and the Commission.
If a Member State is not the original locus of the application for release, its regulatory powers become substantially minimized under the current Deliberate Release Directive.
Despite a procedure for third-party Member State objections, both the comitology procedure and the requirement that objections (even precautionary ones) be substantiated with science limit the Member States' ability to block GMO release into other Member States. In this sense, then, mutual recognition is still significant in that after the GMO has been approved, the doctrine functions to tie the hands of Member States who may have objected to the release from the outset. It becomes even more significant considering that under current ECJ jurisprudence and recent Commission decisions, the likelihood of a Member State successfully defending an absolute ban on an already approved GMO in light of existing Community harmonization is small.
IV.
Towards a More Centralized Regulation of Biotechnology?
As stated above, the Deliberate Release Directive, with its mixing of Member State and Community phases, is designed to serve the dual goals of meaningful Member
State involvement in the approval process and establishing a uniform Community level procedure, eliminating national divergences in regulatory policy. 106 This has not been the case, however, due in some part to legitimate responses of Member States to domestic apprehension about GMOs, but also because of improper, coercive maneuvering by some
Member States who have used the regulatory process, and their power within it, to put pressure on Community institutions to act in other spheres of biotechnology regulation.
107
For instance, the Danish, French, Greek, Italian, and Luxembourg governments had at one point declared that until rules related to monitoring and labeling of GMOs in the Community had been clarified, they would take steps to ensure authorizations for placing on the market would be suspended.
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The point is that the collaborative elements of the procedure designed to eliminate regulatory delays have in fact exacerbated them. Part of this problem is due to the fact that, as shown above, meaningful regulatory choices for 
A. Neo-functionalism Reborn to Regulate Biotechnology?
One natural response to the current biotechnology conundrum would be to adjust the balance of power in the approval process, such that the Community drives the process from the outset, ensuring uniformity in the application of standards, with the Member
States taking up a subsidiary role. This is an adaptation of the classic neo-functionalist approach to integration, best understood in this context as Jean Monnet and Ernst Haas envisioned it: a combination of benevolent technocrats and interest-propelled economic groups who would build Community level coalitions supporting European policy over myopic national interests.
110
Technocrats would successfully manage concrete Europeanlevel problems, leading to political momentum for more technocratic, supranational supervision, in a continuous feedback loop.
111
The impetus for this feedback loop in more recent literature has been re-imagined not as success breeding success as the case may be, but rather that, once a rule is chosen, the logic of path dependence drives regulators to choose similar rules, rather than break the mold. were more willing to cede regulatory authority to a supranational regulator where the transaction costs of coordination among independent actors were too high.
119
A problem in ceding regulatory authority to a Community authorities arises in the context of Member States communicating normative regulatory preference, however:
there is a risk of the system becoming deligitimized.
120
The very political sensitivity of GMO regulation, and the grassroots opposition deliberate release has generated in many Member States, counsels against a pure Community driven system, at least in the normative sense. The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and the European Union, for example, all provide that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws, rules, and regulation, or decrees enacted by the "federal" body…They do so in part because they believe that such a system interferes less, not more, with the independent authority of the "state", member nation, or other subsidiary government… Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and 124 This normative preference threatened the legitimacy of the entire system. 125 While Community regulatory tendencies may not fall into the same "technocracy trap" 126 that the WTO did, as the system is older and wiser in many regards, and certainly Community regulatory policy is not at risk of a race to the bottom 127 , at the same time with a highly sensitive and politically charged issue like GMOs, even a hint of normative ambition within a technocratic regime could be disastrous. While Community regulators have promoted European regulatory solutions using criteria acceptable throughout the Europe, specifically scientific assessment, risk assessment is not a task solely performed by experts. 128 Broader social developments, cultural traditions and values should be respected as well. 129 The increasing use of framework directives, as opposed to regulations, encourages Member State flexibility and some degree of autonomy. 130 The results of a neo-functional style approach to GMO regulation, however, could be just as politically costly 131 as embedded liberalism has turned out to be for the WTO, particularly in light of the upcoming referendums on the Constitutional Treaty.
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B. Regulatory Anarchy -A Uniquely European Solution
Regulatory anarchy shares with neo-functionalism the notion that integration should be incremental, with previous cooperative regulatory successes building momentum for future cooperative regulations. 133 The major difference is that this cooperation happens as between national regulators rather than between supranational officials or interest groups. 134 Bignami points out that when regulators bargain to a successful result, thereby obviating the need for Community interference on the part of the ECJ or the Commission for instance, the regulators are interpreting the Treaty article, the Directive, the standards, and the application of the standards. "national regulators agreed, in the text of the directive, to periodically review its application and to negotiate more precise terms where experience showed that national 136 Bignami, supra note 8 at 110. 137 Id. 138 while the framework directive and accompanying legislation outlines in broad strokes how regulatory bodies are meant to act, and this is enforced at a Community level, the detailed terms of the function of the regulatory regime are negotiated on an intra-Member State level.
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The regulatory anarchy approach is particularly well suited to the current biotechnology regulatory debacle. If the current regime was re-engineered so that the initial approval process did not involve one Member State but rather a consortium of regulators, negotiating to the most acceptable result (with the assumed trade-offs over time as Bignami envisions), this would solve the problem of one Member State capturing the process and also ensure that there is no perceived Community level insensitivity.
Since the enactment of the Deliberate Release Directive, the Community has moved towards instruments that approximate an idea of regulatory anarchy, particularly the Food and Feed Regulation. Unlike in the Deliberate Release Directive, however, at the time of application the Member State must immediately forward the dossier on to the 142 Bignami, supra note 8 at 107. 143 Anne-Marie Slaughter points to this "regulation by networks" and the comitology procedure in the EU as an example of her broader theory that international institutions in general are moving towards a new model of transgovernmental networks. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 40, 43 (2004) . 144 Food and Feed Regulation, supra note 59. The Food and Feed Regulation only regulates GMOs in food and feed and is therefore more limited in scope than the Deliberate Release Directive. 145 Id. at art. 5(2).
European Food Safety Authority 146 (EFSA) and other Member States. 147 At this point, the EFSA, and not the initial Member State, oversees the risk assessment, only conferring with the Member State authority in select instances. 148 The EFSA acts as a hub in an interactive network between Member States, the Commission, and industry. 149 The EFSA is primarily composed of Member State representatives chosen by a collaborative process between the Council, Commission, and the Parliament. 150 The advantage of EFSA oversight 151 is that the Member States can credibly commit themselves to longterm environmental and consumer-protection goals before the approval process is engaged. 152 Delegated authority in this system is advantageous to Member States pursuing long term goals, and certainly the assessment powers of individual Member
States are diminished in the initial stage of the process. 153 Because the costs of defection of non-compliant Member States from a regulatory system are high in the context of GMOs, it is likely that national regulators will be willing to cede some power to Community level institutions in exchange for control over enforcement in other parts of the system. 154 This action is partially a response to the need for credible commitments to a unified regulatory approach. 155 In another cross-over from neo-functionalism, by creating a Community level Member State negotiating process, regulatory transaction costs are also reduced for individual Member States.
It is important to note that the protection of national interests is not necessarily maintained by reserving a specific degree of competence to the national authorities. 156 At the same time, if a high degree of Member State representation within the Community institutions responsible for risk assessment is maintained, as is the case with the EFSA, the centralization of the procedure around Community institutions does not necessarily have to lead to a centralization of the procedure per se. 157 In addition, as discussed above, the Commission can only make a final decision on a deliberate release if the Council fails to give a ruling. The goal of this exercise is to conceptualize a way for the GMO regulatory system to function smoothly and maintain political accountability. The Member State input at the beginning of the approval process is arguably the most problematic part of the Deliberate Release Directive because it allows one Member State's regulatory preferences to decide for all. As well, this first stage of the approval process has allowed Member States to effectively ban GMOs from entering the Community. A revamped system such as the Food and Feed Regulation whereby initial approval competence is preserved at the Community level may alleviate these problems, however Member State input and the opportunity to negotiate among regulators should be spelled out in a more meaningful way than the indirect input method provided by Council representation in the Food and Feed Regulation. 159 Brosset, supra note 16 at 578.
V. Conclusion
The problem of GMO regulation is largely a problem of regulatory gridlock. The gridlock is complicated however by the fact that GMO release into the Community has captured the minds of Europeans in a way that other regulatory objectives have not.
Further complicating matters is the nature of GMO release, particularly the fact that GMOs can travel across national borders independently (i.e. they do not respect national borders) and once they are released into the environment, it is not clear that they can be effectively removed. All of this requires a system whereby decisions can be made in a collaborative way, respecting the needs of civil society in individual Member States while still preserving the regulatory efficiency essential to integration. By embracing the horizontal, anarchic regulatory tendencies which an integrating Europe has tended towards, rather than top-down neo-functionalism, the European Union may move closer to an efficient and acceptable system of GMO regulation. Indeed, the seeds have already been sown in new legislation like the Food and Feed Regulation.
